We show that the model-checking problem is decidable for a fragment of the epistemic µ-calculus with imperfect information and perfect recall. The fragment allows free variables within the scope of epistemic modalities in a restricted form that avoids constructing formulas embodying any form of common knowledge. Our calculus subsumes known decidable fragments of epistemic CT L LT L, may express winning strategies in two-player games with one player having imperfect information and non-observable objectives, and, with a suitable encoding, decidable instances of the model-checking problem for AT L iR can be encoded as instances of the model-checking problem for the µ-calculus of knowledge.
Introduction
The µ-calculus of knowledge is an enrichment of the µ-calculus on trees with individual epistemic modalities K a (and its dual, denoted P a ). It is designed with the aim that, like the classical modal µ-calculus, it would subsume most combinations of temporal and epistemic logics. The µ-calculus of knowledge is more expressive than linear or branching temporal epistemic logics [12, 20] , propositional dynamic epistemic logics [21] , or the alternating epistemic µ-calculus [4] . On the other hand, some gaps in its expressive power seem to exist, as witnessed by recent observations in [4] showing that formulas like ⟪a⟫p 1 Up 2 are not expressible in the fixpoint version of AT L. This expressivity gap can be reproduced in the µ-calculus of knowledge, though the µ-calculus of knowledge is richer than the alternating µ-calculus.
A rather straightforward fragment of the epistemic µ-calculus which has a decidable model-checking problem is the one in which knowledge modalities apply only to closed formulas, that is, formulas in which all second-order variables are bound by some fixpoint operator. The decidability of this fragment follows from recent results on the decidability of the emptiness problem for two player games with one player having incomplete information and with non-observable winning conditions [6] .
However more expressive fragments having a decidable model-checking problem seem to exist. For example, winning strategies in two-player games with imperfect information can be encoded as fixpoint formulas in the µ-calculus of knowledge, but not in the above-mentioned restricted fragment. The same holds for some formulas in AT L with imperfect information and perfect recall (AT L iR ) [19, 3] : the AT L formula ⟪a⟫ ◻ p can be expressed in a modal µ-calculus of knowledge as νZ. ⋁ α∈Acta K a p ∧ ⋀ β∈Act Ag∖{a} [α, β]Z . And there are variants of AT L iR for which the model-checking problem is decidable [7] . Note that a translation of each instance of the model-checking problem for AT L into instances of the model-checking problems for the µ-calculus of knowledge is also possible but requires the modification of the models, as suggested on page 8 below.
Our aim in this paper is to identify such a larger fragment of the epistemic µ-calculus for which model-checking is decidable. The fragment we propose here allows an epistemic modality K a to be applied to a non-closed µ-calculus formula φ, but in such a way that avoids expressing properties that construct any variant of common knowledge for two or more agents. Roughly, the technical restriction is the following: two epistemic operators, referring to the knowledge of two different agents a and b, can be applied to non-closed parts of a formula only if the two agents have compatible observations (in the sense that the observability relation of one of the agents is a refinement of the observability relation of the other agent). The variant presented here relies on a concrete semantics, in the sense of [9] , with the observability relation for each agent a being syntactically identified by a subset Π a of atomic propositions. We require this in order to syntactically define our fragment of µ-calculus of knowledge with a decidable model-checking problem: the compatibility of two observability relations ∼ a and ∼ b is specified at the syntactic level by imposing that either Π a ⊆ Π b or vice-versa.
The epistemic µ-calculus with perfect recall has a history-based semantics: for each finite transition system T , the formulas of the epistemic µ-calculus must be interpreted over the tree unfolding of T . This makes it closer with the tree interpretations of the µ-calculus from [10] . For the classical µ-calculus, there are two ways of proving that the satisfiability and the model-checking problem for the tree interpretation of the logic is decidable: either by providing translations to parity games, or by means of a Finite Model Theorem which ensures that a formula has a tree interpretation iff it has a statebased interpretation over a finite transition system (this is known to be equivalent with memoryless determinacy for parity games, see e.g. [5] ).
The generalization of the automata approach does not seem to be possible for epistemic µ-calculus, mainly due to the absence of an appropriate generalization of tree automata equivalent with the µ-calculus of knowledge. So we take the approach of providing a generalization of the Finite Model Theorem for our fragment of the epistemic µ-calculus. This result says roughly that the tree interpretation of a formula over the tree unfolding of a given finite transition system T which contains the epistemic operators K a or P a is exactly the "tree unfolding" of the finitary interpretation of the formula in a second transition system T ′ , which is obtained by determinizing the projection of T onto the observations of agent a, a construction that is common for decidable fragments of temporal epistemic logics. Our contribution consists in showing that this construction can be applied for the appropriate fragment of the µ-calculus of knowledge. The proof is given in terms of commutative diagramms between predicate transformers that are the interpretations of non-closed formulas.
The model checking problem for the decidable fragment of the epistemic µ-calculus is non-elementary hard due to the non-elementary hardness of the model-checking problem for the linear temporal logic of knowledge [22] . In the full version of this paper [?], we provide a self-contained proof of this result, by a reduction of the emptiness problem for star-free regular expressions.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows: in the next section we recall the predicate transformer semantics of the µ-calculus and adapt it to our epistemic extension, both for the tree interpretation and the finitary interpretation. We then give our weak variant of the Finite Model Theorem for the classical µ-calculus in the third section. The fourth section serves for introducing our fragment of the epistemic µ-calculus and for proving the decidability of its model-checking problem. We end with a section with conclusions and comments.
Preliminaries
We start by fixing a series of notions and notations used in the rest of the paper.
A * denotes the set of words over A. The length of α ∈ A * , is denoted α and the prefix of α up to position i is denoted α[1..i]. Hence, α[1..0] = ε is the empty word. The (strict) prefix ordering on A * is denoted ⪯ (≺). Given a set A and an integer n ∈ N, an A-tree of outdegree ≤ n is a partial function t ∶ [1 . . . n] * ⇀ A whose support, denoted supp(t), is a prefix-closed subset of the finite sequences of integers in [1 . . . n]. A node of t is an element of its support. A path in t is a pair (x, ρ) consisting of a node x and the sequence of t-labels of all the nodes which are prefixes of
A multi-agent system (MAS, for short) is a tuple M = Q, Ag, δ, q 0 , Π, (Π a ) a∈Ag , π with Ag being the set of agents, Q the set of states, q 0 the initial state of the system, δ ⊆ Q × Q, Π the set of atomic propositions, π ∶ Q → 2 Π and for all a ∈ Ag, Π a ⊆ Π. A run in the structure M from a state q 0 is an infinite sequence of states ρ = q 0 q 1 q 2 ... such that (q i , q i+1 ) ∈ δ for all i ≥ 0. The set of finite runs in M is denoted Runs(M ). Throughout this paper we consider only finite systems, with Q = {1, . . . , n} and q 0 = 1, and we assume that Q contains only reachable states.
The 2 Π -tree representing the unfolding of a MAS M , denoted t M , is defined by
. For any two positions x, y ∈ supp(t M ) with x = y , we denote x ∼ a y if for any n ≤ x we have that
Henceforth, for a word w ∈ (2 Π )
* , by w Πa we denote the sequence defined by w
Note also that the relation x ∼ a x ′ is both a relation on the nodes of the tree t M and on the runs of M .
Predicate transformers: Given a set
Following the Knaster-Tarski theorem, any monotone A-transformer f ∶ 2
A has a unique least and greatest fixpoint, denoted lfp f , resp. gfp f .
For an A-transformer f ∶ 2 A n → 2 A , a tuple of sets B 1 , . . . , B n ⊆ A and some
Note that when f is monotone, f k (B 1 , . . . , B k−1 , ⋅, B k+1 , . . . , B n ) is monotone too. Hence, both lfp f k (B1,...,B k−1 ,⋅,B k+1 ,...,Bn) and gfp f k (B1,...,B k−1 ,⋅,B k+1 ,...,Bn) exist. These fixpoints can also be seen as the following A-transformers: lfp
A , defined respectively as:
Note that both these A-transformers are constant in their k-th argument. It is also known that both these A-transformers are monotone if f is monotone.
The µ-calculus of Knowledge
Syntax: The syntax of the µ-calculus of knowledge (in positive form) is based on the following sets of symbols: a finite set of agents Ag, a family of finite sets of atomic propositions (Π a ) a∈Ag (no restrictions apply on the pairwise intersections between these sets), with Π = ⋃ a∈Ag Π a , and a finite set of second-order variables Z = {Z 1 , . . . , Z k }. The set Π a represents the set of atoms whose value is observable by agent a at each instant (in the sense to be developed further).
The grammar for the formulas of the µ-calculus of knowledge is:
ϕ ∶∶= p ¬p Z ϕ ∧ ϕ ϕ ∨ ϕ AXϕ EXϕ K a φ P a φ µZ.ϕ νZ.ϕ where p ∈ Π, a ∈ Ag and Z ∈ Z. Formulas of the type K a φ are read as agent a knows that φ holds. The dual of K a , denoted P a , (and definable as P a φ = ¬K a ¬φ if negation were allowed), reads as agent a considers that φ is possible. As usual, for a subset of agents A ⊆ Ag we may denote E A the "everybody knows" operator,
The fragment of the µ-calculus of knowledge which does not involve the knowledge operator K a (or its dual) is called here the plain µ-calculus, or simply the µ-calculus, when there's no risk of confusion. As usual, we say that a formula φ is closed if each variable Z in φ occurs in the scope of a fixpoint operator for Z.
We will also briefly consider in this paper the modal µ-calculus of knowledge, for the sake of comparison with other combinations of temporal and epistemic logics. It has almost the same grammar, but with the nexttime operators EX and AX replaced with modal nexttime operators ⟨α⟩, resp. [α] with α representing a tuple of action symbols α = (α a ) a∈Ag . Note that the modal µ-calculus of knowledge can be translated to the non-modal µ-calculus of knowledge by converting each action name α ∈ Act a into an atomic proposition, so the main results of this paper generalize easily to this calculus.
We give two semantics of the µ-calculus of knowledge: a tree semantics and a finitary semantics. The tree semantics is required because we assume that agents have perfect recall, and hence they remember all observations made since the system started. The second is necessary for the decision problem. The equivalence between the two semantics on trees generated by MASs, which gives the decidability of the modelchecking problem, is a weak form of memoryless determinacy for tree automata. We present here both semantics of the µ-calculus of knowledge in a predicate-transformer flavor, more appropriate for stating a number of properties of the logic.
The tree semantics of the µ-calculus of knowledge is given in terms of 2 Π∪Z -trees. For a given tree t, each formula φ which contains variables Z 1 , . . . , Z n is associated with a supp(t)-transformer φ ∶ 2 supp(t) n → 2 supp(t) by structural induction, as follows: -The two atoms p and ¬p are interpreted as constant supp(t)-transformers p ∶ 2 supp(t) n → 2 supp(t) and ¬p ∶ 2 supp(t) n → 2 supp(t) , defined by the sets p = {x ∈ supp(t) p ∈ π(t(x))}, resp. ¬p = {x ∈ supp(t) p ∈ π(t(x))}.
-Each variable Z i ∈ Z is interpreted as the i-th projection on 2 supp(t) n , that is, as the supp(t)-transformer
-Each of the two nexttime operators is mapped to a supp(t)-transformer, denoted AX, resp. EX ∶ 2
→ 2 supp(t) , defined as follows: for each S ⊆ supp(t), AX(S) = {x ∈ supp(t) ∀i ∈ N if xi ∈ supp(t) then xi ∈ S} EX(S) = {x ∈ supp(t) ∃i ∈ N with xi ∈ supp(t) and xi ∈ S} Then AXφ = AX ○ φ , and EXφ = EX ○ φ .
-Each pair of epistemic operators is mapped to supp(t)-transformers K a , resp. P a ∶ 2 supp(t) → 2 supp(t) , defined as follows: for each S ⊆ supp(t), K a (S) = {x ∈ supp(t) ∀y ∈ supp(t) with x ∼ a y we have y ∈ S} P a (S) = {x ∈ supp(t) ∃y ∈ supp(t) with x ∼ a y and y ∈ S} Then K a φ = K a ○ φ and P a φ = P a ○ φ . Note that the two supp(t)-transformers K a and P a are dual and we have that K a (S) = P a (S), with ⋅ denoting the set complementation. We also denote t ⊧ φ iff ε ∈ φ .
The following property says that the µ-calculus of knowledge cannot distinguish between isomorphic trees: Proposition 1. For any two MASs M 1 and M 2 for which there exists some tree isomorphism χ ∶ 2
, and for any µ-calculus of knowledge formula φ, the following diagram commutes:
Proof. By straightforward structural induction on the formula φ.
1. For φ = p we have that
The proof is similar for φ = ¬p.
For
By assuming that the property holds for φ 1 and φ 2 , we get
We similar proof can be given for φ = φ 1 ∧ φ 2 .
The proof is similar for φ = EXφ 1 .
A similar proof can be given for φ = P a φ 1 .
The proof is similar for φ = νZ i .φ 1 .
Comparison with other temporal epistemic frameworks
We discuss the relationship between the µ-calculus of knowledge and other temporal epistemic logics or game models with imperfect information and perfect recall. As already noted e.g. in [20] , the following fixpoint formula defines the common knowledge operator for two agents:
On the other hand, it's easy to see that the (modal variant of the) µ-calculus of knowledge is more expressive than the alternating epistemic µ-calculus of [4] , due to the possibility to insert knowledge operators "in between" the quantifiers that occur in the semantics of the coalition operators. The relationship with AT L iR is more involved, as we detail in the sequel.
Given a set of agents A ⊆ Ag, denote Act A the cartesian product of the set of action symbols for each agent in A, Act A = ⨉ a∈A Act a . Then, formulas of the type ⟪A⟫ ◻ p can be expressed as the fixpoint formula νZ.
Formulas containing the until operator cannot be translated into the µ-calculus of knowledge. The reason is similar to the one explained in [4] : in formulas of the type ⟪a⟫ p the objective p might not be observable by the agent a, who might only be able to know that, at some given time instance, sometimes in the past, the objective was achieved on all identically observable traces.
Given an AT L iR formula φ = ⟪a⟫p 1 Up 2 where p 1 and p 2 are atomic proposition, a MAS M and a finite run ρ in M , the instance of the model-checking problem M, ρ ⊧ φ can be translated to an instance of the model-checking problem in the modal µ-calculus of knowledge of the following formula:
and the modified system M ′ , in which are created some copies of the successors of the states s labelled with the atomic proposition p 2 and the corresponding paths. The copies are labelled with the existing atomic propositions in the successor of s to which is added the new atomic proposition past p2 . It will label all the states occurring after state s carrying a p 2 . This mechanism is similar with the "bookkeeping" employed in the two-player games utilized in [7] for checking whether the same formula φ holds at a state of a MAS.
The formalisation of the modification of M is given below: For any multi-agent → r where α ∈ Act a and β = β 1 , ⋯, β n with β i ∈ Act Ag∖{a} , in M ′ we have:
.., ρ and α i+1 by act(ρ, i), i = 0, ..., ρ − 1. We redefine the tree unfolding for the multi player games as being a partial mapping
In this case, we say that two runs ρ and ρ ′ are indistinguishable (observationally equivalent) to a coalition A (and note
We define a strategy, as it is defined in [7] , σ for a coalition A as any mapping σ ∶ 2
If σ is compatible with a run ρ, then it is compatible with any run that is indistinguishable from ρ to A.
We also use [α]p to express the fact that for all the successors xi of x for which t edge M (xi) = α we have that p ∈ π(t node M (xi)). In order to prove the equivalence between the two problems, we prove that for any system M and any AT L iR formula φ = ⟪a⟫p 1 Up 2 , there exists a system M ′ as defined below and a formula φ
such that for any run ρ in M and any run ρ in M ′ for which the projection in M is ρ, M, ρ ⊧ φ if and only if M ′ , ρ ⊧ φ ′ . This construction can be extended to the whole AT L by structural induction on the formula.
Multi-player games with incomplete information can also be translated into the µ-calculus of knowledge. Recall briefly that a (synchronous) two-player game is a tuple G = Q, Ag, (Act a ) a∈Ag , δ, Q 0 , (Obs a ) a∈Ag , (o a ) a∈Ag , par with Q denoting the set of states, Ag = {A, B} the set of players, δ ⊆ Q×⨉ a∈Ag Act a ×Q denoting the transition relation, o a ∶ Q → Obs a denoting the observability relation for player a and par ∶ Q → N defining the parity of each state.
A player a ∈ Ag plays by choosing a feasible strategy, which is a mapping σ ∶ (Obs a ) * → Act a . A strategy for a is winning when all the runs that are compatible with that strategy satisfy the property: the maximal parity of a state which occurs infinitely often in the run is even. The winning condition might be non-observable to a, as it might happen that two identically observable states q 1 , q 2 ∈ Q might have different parities.
The set of winning strategies for a player in a multi-player game with imperfect information is then expressible within the µ-calculus of knowledge, similarly to the known encoding of the set of winning strategies in a parity game into the µ-calculus from e.g. [10, 18] . Assuming that the largest parity in Q is even and the atomic proposition p i holds exactly in all states with parity i, the following µ-calculus of knowledge formula encodes the winning strategies for player a:
The model-checking problem
The model-checking problem for the µ-calculus of knowledge is the problem of deciding, given a MAS M and a closed formula φ, whether t M ⊧ φ.
The undecidability of the model-checking problem for combinations of temporal and epistemic logics based on a synchronous and perfect recall semantics and containing the common knowledge operator [22, 21] implies the following result.
Theorem 1. The model-checking problem for the µ-calculus of knowledge is undecidable.
The next two sections are dedicated to finding a fragment of the µ-calculus of knowledge with a decidable model-checking problem.
Revisiting the Decidability of the Model-checking Problem for the Tree Semantics of the plain µ-calculus
Given a multi-agent system M = (Q, Ag, δ, q 0 , Π, (Π a ) a∈Ag , π), and an agent a ∈ Ag, we may define the relation Γ We now define a second semantics for the µ-calculus of knowledge, which works on the set of states of a MAS M . Each formula φ which contains variables Z 1 , . . . , Z n is associated with a Q-transformer ⌈φ⌉ ∶ 2 Q n → 2 Q , again by structural induction:
-⌈p⌉ resp. ⌈¬p⌉ are the constant Q-transformers ⌈p⌉ = {q ∈ Q p ∈ π(q)}, resp. ⌈¬p⌉ = {q ∈ Q p ∈ π(q)}.
-Both nexttime modalities are associated with Q-transformers AX
(S) = {q ∈ Q ∃r ∈ Q with (q, r) ∈ δ and r ∈ S} Then ⌈AXφ⌉ = AX f ○ ⌈φ⌉ and, similarly, ⌈EXφ⌉ = EX f ○ ⌈φ⌉, -Both epistemic operators are associated with Q-transformers K
The following result represents a variant of the Finite Model Theorem for µ-calculus and is proved by structural induction on the formula φ in [?]:
. . , n} and q 0 = 1, and a (plain) µ-calculus formula φ, the following diagram commutes:
We also say that the diagram 2 holds (or commutes) for the formula φ in the system M .
Proof.
We proceed by structural induction on the formula φ. Note first that the diagram 2 holds for the base cases:
The induction step relies on two groups of properties: on one side, the commutativity of t The first group of properties is summarized in the following identities:
1. For any two sets S 1 , S 2 ⊆ Q,
The following property is essential for the induction step involving the fixpoint operators:
Claim. Suppose φ is a µ-calculus formula for which the commutative diagram 2 holds. Given S ∈ 2 Q n with S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) and an index i ≤ n, denoteφ i S the function
Also denote ⌈φ
Proof. We may prove by induction on j ∈ N that
where the first empty set is an element of 2 supp(t M ) whereas the second is an element of 2 Q .
The base case is straightforward, since, for j = 0, Identity 4 reduces to
For the induction step we may use the induction hypothesis about the commutative diagram 2 (applied for producing the third identity below) to conclude that:
We then need to prove that ⌈φ
is an increasing sequence of subsets of Q. To that end, we will prove that ⌈φ i ⋅ ⌉(⋅) is monotonously increasing in both arguments. That is, ⌈φ i S1
Q and for all S 1 = (S 11 , S 12 , ..., S 1n ) and S 2 = (S 21 , S 22 , ..., S 2n ) with S 1k ⊆ S 2k for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. This can be proved by induction on the structure of φ as follows:
1. For φ = p or φ = ¬p, the property holds since in this case ⌈φ⌉ is constant. 2. For φ = Z r , ⌈φ⌉ is the r-th projection. If r = i, then ⌈φ i S1
assuming that the property holds for φ 1 and φ 2 , ⌈φ
⌉(S
′′
) and therefore ⌈φ i S1
⌉(S ′′
.
That is, the predecessors of nodes in ⌈φ 1 ⌉ that have no successors outside ⌈φ 1 ⌉.
It is easy to see that AX f is monotonous using the definition: given S 1 , S 2 ∈ 2 Q , S 1 ⊆ S 2 , we have
and since S 1 ⊆ S 2 , if r ∈ S 1 , then r ∈ S 2 . Hence,
Then, since ⌈φ
, by applying AX f which is monotonous, we obtain that AX f (⌈φ
. A similar proof can be given for φ = EXφ 1 .
For
We can prove, as we did in the case of AX f , that K f a is monotonous and applying it to ⌈φ i 1,S1
For φ = P a φ 1 the proof results from the duality of K 
⌉(S ′′
= lfp ⌈φ1⌉r (S1,1,...,S1,r−1,⋅,S1,r+1,...,S1,i−1,S ′ ,S1,i+1,...,S1,n) .
From the inductive hypothesis we have that ⌈φ
′′
) and then, by applying lfp, we obtain that lfp ⌈φ1⌉r(S1,1,...,S1,r−1,⋅,S1,r+1,...,S1,i−1,S ′ ,S1,i+1,...,S1,n)
⊆ lfp ⌈φ1⌉r(S2,1,...,S2,r−1,⋅,S2,r+1,...,S2,i−1,S ′ ,S2,i+1,...,S2,n)
and then ⌈φ i S1
We may conclude that ⌈φ i S ⌉ is monotonously increasing. Now, we know that ∅ ⊆ ⌈φ i S
⌉(∅).
By induction, we can prove that ⌈φ
is an increasing sequence of subsets. This sequence stabilizes at a certain integer k, which is the fixpoint of ⌈φ i S ⌉:
As a consequence of this and of Identity 4, the fixpoint ofφ i S is reached for
which ends the proof of Claim 4
Returning to the proof of Theorem 2, the induction step concerning the least fixed point follows easily:
where in the last step we utilized the claim above. A similar proof gives the commutation property for the greatest fixpoint. ◻
A Fragment of the µ-calculus of Knowledge with a Decidable Model-Checking Problem
In this section, we first introduce some additional notations and notions. Given a MAS M and two agents a 1 , a 2 ∈ Ag, we say that the two agents have compatible observability if either Π a1 ⊆ Π a2 or Π a1 ⊇ Π a2 . Given a formula φ, let T φ denote the syntactic tree of φ. We also consider that, in T φ , each node labeled with a variable also has a successor, labeled with ⊺. This convention brings the property that each node in T φ whose formula is a variable has a closed subformula (which is ⊺).
The syntactic tree is constructed by structural induction, with
where Op ∈ {AX, EX, K a , P a , µZ, νZ}
We then denote f orm(x) the subformula of φ whose syntactic tree is T φ x , i.e. the subtree of T φ rooted at x, and say that x is closed if f orm(x) is closed.
We then say that an epistemic operator Op ∈ {K a , P a a ∈ Ag} is non-closed at a node x in a formula φ if f orm(x) is not closed, Op labels a node y ⪰ x and for all the nodes y ′ lying on the path between x and y we have that f orm(y ′ ) is not closed.
For each node x ∈ supp(T φ ), we also define AgN Cl φ (x) as being the set of agents a for which K a or P a is non-closed at x. In addition, given two distinct nodes x 1 ≺ x 2 with x 2 being closed, we say that x 2 is a nearest closed successor of x 1 if no other closed node lies on the path from x 1 to x 2 .
Definition 1. The µ-calculus of non-mixing epistemic fixpoints is the fragment of the µ-calculus of knowledge consisting of formulas φ satisfying the following property:
Any two agents a and b for which there exist epistemic operators Op a ∈ {K a , P a }, Op b ∈ {K b , P b } such that both Op a and Op b are not closed at some node x of T φ must have compatible observability, i.e.
All formulas of KB n [12, 13] , that is, CT L with individual knowledge operators, are formulas of the µ-calculus of non-mixing epistemic fixpoints. Other examples of nonmixing formulas are the following (a and b are two agents such that Π a ⊆ Π b ):
Examples of formulas that are not in the µ-calculus of non-mixing epistemic fixpoints are (a and b are two agents such that Π a ⊆ Π b and Π b ⊆ Π a ):
Theorem 3. The model-checking problem for the µ-calculus of non-mixing epistemic fixpoints is decidable.
The crux of the proof consists of proving a commutativity property relating t 
Similarly,
We can observe that t , 2) over the same set of atomic propositions, we say that M 1 is an in-splitting of M 2 if there exists a pair of surjective mappings χ = (χ st , χ tr ), with χ st ∶ Q 1 → Q 2 , χ tr ∶ δ 1 → δ 2 satisfying the following properties: Further, the pair χ = (χ st , χ tr ) is called an in-splitting mapping. Also, we may write χ ∶ M 1 → M 2 to denote the fact that χ = (χ st , χ tr ) is a witness for M 1 being an in-splitting of M 2 .
Definition 2. Given two MASs
Note that an in-splitting mapping (term borrowed from symbolic dynamics [15] ) represents a surjective functional bisimulation between two transition systems. The following proposition can be seen as a generalization of this remark (proof given in [?]):
Proposition 2. Consider two MASs
over the same set of atomic propositions, connected by an in-splitting mapping χ = (χ st , χ tr ) ∶ M 1 → M 2 . Then for any plain µ-calculus formula φ the following diagram commutes:
Proof. Let S 1 , ..., S n ⊆ 2 Q2 . We prove hence by structural induction on the structure of the formula φ that
Since π 2 (χ st (q)) = π 1 (q) and χ st is surjective, we can conclude that
The proof is similar for φ = ¬p. 2. For φ = Z i , ⌈φ⌉ is the i-th projection and hence
The proof for φ = φ 1 ∧ φ 2 is similar.
Further, we want to prove that this set equals to
We prove it by double inclusion. Let first take a q in the first set. We have that for all r ∈ Q 1 , if q → r ∈ δ 1 then r ∈ χ
. From the surjectivity of χ st and χ tr and properties 1) and 3) in Definition 13, there is a q ′ ∈ Q 2 such that q ∈ χ
That is, using again the surjectivity, for all r
.., S n ). Again, from the surjectivity of χ st and χ tr and properties 1) and 3) in the above definition we have that there exists q ∈ Q 1 s.t. χ st (q) = q ′ and for any transition q ′ → r ′ ∈ δ 2 we have transition q → r ∈ δ 1 such that q
Since χ st is surjective and property 3) holds, if
Remark 4 Proposition 2 does not hold for general µ-calculus of knowledge formulas.
To see this, consider the system depicted in Fig. 2 (a) , which is an in-splitting of the system from Fig. 1 (a) , resulting from splitting state 3 in two states, denoted 3 and 4, (i.e. χ(1) = 1, χ(2) = 2, χ(3) = χ(4) = 3) with transitions (3, 4) ∈ δ and (4, 4) ∈ δ. 
On the other hand,
That is, t The following notion corresponds with the "determinization" used for model-checking LTLK/CTLK [22, 8] or solving 2-player parity games with one player having incomplete information [6] :
as follows: ((s, S) , (r, R)) where (s, r) ∈ δ and R = {r ′ ∈ Q π a (r ′ ) = π a (r) and ∃s ′ ∈ S with (s ′ , r ′ ) ∈ δ}.
-δ is composed of all tuples of the form

-π(s, S) = π(S) = π(s).
The a-distinction of M , denoted ∆ a (M ), is the restriction of ∆ Given a run ρ in Runs(∆ a (M )), we denote ρ 1 the projection of ρ onto its first component. Ag, δ, q 0 , Π, (Π a ) a∈Ag , π) , the following two properties hold:
Lemma 1. Given a MAS M = (Q,
Proof. We prove the first property by induction on the length of the path ρ. It easy to see that property holds when ρ =q 0 = (q 0 , {q 0 }). In this case, ρ ′ can be only ρ. Suppose now the property holds for any path ρ in ∆ a (M ) with ρ = n. Let ρ ′ in ∆ a (M ) with ρ ′ = n + 1 that ends in (q, S). Then exists a path
of length n such that ρ ′ = ρ ′′ ⋅ (q, S) with (q n+1 , S n+1 ) = (q, S). From the inductive hypothesis, S n−1 = {r ∈ Q ∃ρ in M that ends in r with ρ ∼ a ρ ′′ 1
}.
Since (q n−1 , S n−1 ) → (q, S) ∈ δ, by definition:
. That is,
For the second property we also use the induction on the length of paths ρ and ρ ′ . The basic case is similar as above, since ρ ′ can only be ρ. Suppose the property holds for any ρ and any ρ ′ of length n with ρ ′ ∼ a ρ and take ρ and ρ ′ ∈ Runs(∆ a (M )) of length n + 1, with ρ that ends in (s, S) and
Since ρ ∼ a ρ ′ , we have that π a (s) = π a (r) and then S = R. That is, ρ ′ ends in (r, S).
Given a MAS M = (Q, Ag, δ, q 0 , Π, (Π a ) a∈Ag , π), and an agent a ∈ Ag, we say that M is a-distinguished if Γ a defined on page 10 is a congruence relation, that is, an equivalence relation with the following property:
Lemma 2. For a MAS M = (Q, Ag, δ, q 0 , Π, (Π a ) a∈Ag , π) and an agent a ∈ Ag with Γ a a congruence relation, we have that sΓ a r if and only if there exists ρ and ρ ′ ∈ Runs(M ) s.t. ρ ends in s and ρ ′ ends in r with ρ ∼ a ρ ′ .
Proof. For the direct implication the proof follows form the definition of Γ a . The proof in the other direction is made by induction on the length of the path ρ.
We
and Γ a is a congruence, we can conclude that sΓ n+1 a r and then sΓ a r.
Lemma 3. Given a MAS
M and an agent a ∈ Ag, for any two reachable states (q, S) and (r, R) in ∆ a (M ), (q, S)Γ a (r, R) if and only if S = R.
Proof. We use Lemma 1 for the proof.
In the direct sense, if (q, S) is reachable, we have that
, we have that there exists ρ in M ending in (r, R) with ρ ∼ a ρ and
In the other direction, let take (q, S) and (r, S) two reachable states in ∆ a (M ) then for all ρ that ends in (q, S) we have that
Then, by the second point of Lemma 1, there exists ρ ′ in ∆ a (M ) with ρ ′ ∼ a ρ which ends the proof.
Proposition 3. 1. For any MAS
M , ∆ a (M ) is an in-splitting of M . We denote this in-splitting as ∆ −1 a,M ∶ ∆ a (M ) → M .
Whenever the MAS M is clear from the context, we use the notation
Proof. For the first property, suppose ∆ a (M ) is an in-splitting of M . We define the following mapping χ ∶ ∆ a (M ) → M for any q ′ , r ′ ∈Q, q ′ = (q, S 1 ) and r ′ = (r, S 2 ) as:
These two mappings satisfy the properties from Definition 2 since:
The surjectivity follows from the definition and the assumption that we work only with MAS in which Q contains only reachable states.
For the second property, we have to prove that Γ a is a congruence relation over ∆ a (M ). To prove the symmetry, take (q, S)Γ a (r, R) in ∆ a (M ). From Lemma 3, we have that R = S. Let now, take any path ρ ′ in ∆ a (M ) ending in (r, S). From Lemma 1 we have that
Since (q, S) is reachable, q ∈ S and then, there exists ρ in M , ending in q such that
. That is, there exists ρ ending in (q, S ′ ) s.t. ρ ∼ a ρ ′ And, using the second property of Lemma 1, we get that S ′ = S, i.e., there exists ρ ending in (q, S) s.t. ρ ∼ a ρ ′ Hence (r, S)Γ a (q, S) which means that Γ a is symmetric. Reflexivity and transitivity hold trivially. For proving that Γ a is a congruence, note first that, from the definition of
) and (r ′ , S ′ ) are reachable, and using Lemma 3 we may conclude that (q ′ , S
. That is, the diagram commutes for P a P f a too and we can proceed as above for proving symmetry.
If now the diagram commutes, for proving that Γ a is a congruence, take qΓ a r and q → q ′ ∈ δ and r → r ′ ∈ δ and π a (q
From qΓ a r we have that r ∈ P f a (q) and then t
M (q)). We get that there exists x ∈ supp(t M ), x[ x ] = r and x ∈ P a (t −1 M (q)) and therefore there exists y ∈ supp(t M ) with x ∼ a y and
For the inverse implication, suppose that Γ a is a congruence. First, we observe that t
M (S)) holds from the fact that t
Recall that we defined qΓ n a r as: (q, r) ∈ Γ n a iff ∀ρ, ρ ≤ n ending in q, ∃ρ ′ ending in r such that ρ ∼ a ρ ′ . We also define P f,n a (S) = {q ∈ S ∃s ∈ S, (s, q) ∈ Γ n a }. We now prove by induction that P a (t
a (r)) for all n ∈ N and for all r ∈ Q. For n = 0 the inequality trivially holds. Suppose that for n the equation holds for all q ∈ Q. Let x ∈ supp(t M ), x = n + 1, in P a (t
). We want to prove that it is in
), then there exists y ∈ supp(t M ) with x ∼ a y and y[ y ] = r, y ≤ n + 1.
) (from the inductive hypothesis and the
. From the inductive hypothesis, we obtain that x ′ ∈ t −1
It results that, for all n ∈ N and for all r ∈ Q, P a (t
, for all S which ends the proof of the reverse inclusion. From that and from the first inclusion, we can say that P a (t Proposition 5 gives the first restricted form which may lead to the commutativity of Diagram 2 for formulas of the µ-calculus of knowledge. The second restricted form in which the pair K a K f a (resp. P a P f a ) commutes with a system is stated as point 2 in the next proposition:
Proposition 6. Consider two MASs
, with Q 1 = {1, . . . , n 1 } and Q 2 = {1, . . . , n 2 }, related by an in-splitting χ = (χ st , χ tr ) ∶ M 1 → M 2 , and define the tree mappingχ ∶ supp(t M1 ) → supp(t M2 ), whereχ(ε) = ε andχ(xi) =χ(x) ⋅ χ st (i), for any x ∈ supp(t M1 ) and i ∈ Q 1 . Then the following properties hold:
1.χ is a tree isomorphism between t M1 and t M2 and t M2 ○χ =χ ○ t M1 . 2. For any closed formula φ of the µ-calculus of knowledge for which the diagram 2 commutes in the system M 2 , the following property holds:
Proof. The first property is implied by the bijectivity ofχ and the fact that χ is an in-splitting and the property 3 of Definition 2.
For the second property, we may easily prove that
Let x ′ ∈ supp(t M1 ). Then, by definition ofχ, x ′ = xi for some x ∈ supp(t M1 ) and
On the other hand, we have that
From the last two equations, we can see that Identity 9 holds for any x ∈ supp(t M1 ).
We may observe thatχ(
And from the Identity 9, we have thatχ(t M1 (x)) = t M2 (χ(x)), for all x ∈ supp(t M1 ).
As a premise of the third property, we may observe that:
From this, combined with the hypothesis on the commutativity of diagram 2 for φ in M 2 , the isomorphism property forχ in Proposition 1, and Identity 9, we get:
The previous proposition tells us that, for closed formulas of the µ-calculus of knowledge for which Diagram 2 commutes in M 2 , in the eventuality that the system M 2 needs to be replaced with a "larger" system M 1 (for reasons related with the "determinization" that ensures the first type of commutativity of K a P a ), the validity of φ on the tree t M1 can be recovered from the set of states χ We have now the essential ingredients that ensure the decidability of the modelchecking problem for the µ-calculus of non-mixing epistemic fixpoints. The algorithm runs as follows: we proceed by constructing the state-transformer interpretations of the subformulas of φ on the given system M , in a bottom-up traversal of the syntactic tree T φ . As long as we only treat subformulas not containing any epistemic operator, Theorem 2 ensures that these state transformers are correct finitary abstractions of the tree semantics of our subformulas.
The first time we encounter in T φ an epistemic operator K a P a , say, the subformula in the current node is K a φ ′ , we need to replace M with its a-distinction, ∆ a (M ), in order for the appropriate diagram to commute. This replacement is easier when φ ′ is a closed plain µ-calculus formula. By combining Propositions 6 and 5, the tree semantics of the formula K a φ ′ can be computed using the state transformer K
represents the set of states in ∆ a (M ) on which φ ′ holds. The procedure is different when φ ′ is non-closed. In this situation, we cannot determinize M , as observed in the remark 4. Therefore we need to descend along the syntactic tree to all the "nearest" nodes whose formulas are closed, and only there apply the a-distinction construction, thanks to Proposition 6.
Suppose even further that φ ′ itself contains other knowledge operators, and some other knowledge operator K b is encountered during this descent. The "nonmixing" assumption on our formula implies that this other agent b has compatible observability with our a (K a and K b are non-closed at the node associated with K a ). Therefore, the a-distinction of the models applied at lower levels commutes with K b , fact which is ensured by Proposition 5 when the two agents have compatible observability.
This whole process ends when we arrive in the root of the syntactic tree, with an insplitting M ′ of the initial system M and a (constant) state-transformer σ, which gives the finitary abstraction of the set of nodes of the tree t M where φ holds. The following paragraphs formalize this process.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3)
. Given a formula φ in the µ-calculus of non-mixing epistemic fixpoints and a MAS M , we associate with each node x of T φ an in-splitting mapping, denoted T Ins φ (x), such that the following properties hold:
1. For the root ǫ and any not closed node
For any nodes x 1 , x 2 ∈ supp(T φ ) with x 1 ⪯ x 2 , the in-splitting mapping between the two nodes is the composition of the mappings from x 1 to x 2 . Formally,
Then, for any
, where ǫ is the root. 4. For any node x 1 which is a nearest closed successor of the root ǫ, if AgN Cl 
Note that for each node 1x which is not closed in T φ , the node x is not closed in T φ ′ either. Then we put T 
On the other hand, by the assumption that φ is a nonmixing formula, a must have compatible observability with all the agents a 1 , . . . , a k . Therefore, there must exist some i ≤ k such that 
Take then a node x 1 which is a nearest closed successor of the root of T φ1 , ǫ φ1 , and a node x 2 which is a nearest closed successor of ǫ φ2 . By the induction hypothesis we have:
with appropriate in-splittings χ 1 , χ
On the other hand, by the assumption on φ being nonmixing, for any i ≤ k, j ≤ l, the two agents a i and b j must have compatible observability. It therefore follows that there exists a reordering of the union {a 1 , . . . , a k } ∪ {b 1 , . . . , b l } as {c 1 , . . . , c m } such that Π ci ⊆ Π ci+1 for all i ≤ m − 1. Denote then:
By Proposition 4, χ 0 is a c-distinction for any c ∈ {a 1 , . . . , a k } ∪ {b 1 , . . . , b l }. Also, by property 2 of the induction hypothesis, χ 0 is independent of the choice of the nodes
The same property from the induction hypothesis also ensures that, for any nearest closed successor x 2 of ε φ2 , there exist in-splittings χ 
We will then construct T Ins φ (⋅) as follows: 1. For each closed node x which is a leaf in T φ1 but not a nearest closed successor of ǫ φ1 , we put T It's not difficult to see that the resulting mapping T Ins φ2 (⋅) satisfies the five desired properties. More specifically, property 2 amounts to the following identity:
Further, let M x denote the MAS which is the domain of the in-splitting T Ins φ (x), and denote Q x its state-space. Also, for convenience, we denote M x the MAS which represents the codomain of T Ins φ (x), and Q x its state-space. Note that when x, x1 ∈ supp(T φ ), M x = M x1 , and similarly M x = M x2 when x2 ∈ supp(T φ ).
Once we built the tree T Ins φ , we associate with each node x in T φ a state-transformer that will give all the information on the satisfiability of f orm(x) in the given model. Formally, we build a tree T str φ whose domain is supp(T φ ) ∖ {x T φ (x) = } and which, for each node x, represents a state-transformer T str φ (x) ∶ (2
Qx . The construction will be achieved such that f orm(x) ○ t 
for each node x with f orm(x) ≠ . The construction proceeds bottom-up on supp(T φ ). We actually build two trees, 
Note that, once we build T str φ (x) for a node x, T str φ (x) is defined by Identity 14, so we only explain the construction for T str φ (x). For x leave in T φ with T φ (x) = p ∈ Π, we put T str φ (x) = ⌈p⌉ M , the constant statetransformer. Recall that we do not define T str φ (x) for T φ (x) = . For T φ (x) = Z i ∈ Z we put T str φ (x)(S 1 , . . . , S n ) = S i , the i-th projection on (2 Qx ) n . For nodes x with T φ (x) = Op ∈ {AX, EX, K a , P a a ∈ Ag} we put T str φ (x)(S 1 , . . . , S n ) = Op T str φ (x1)(S 1 , . . . , S n ) For T φ (x) ∈ {∧, ∨} we put T str φ (x)(S 1 , . . . , S n ) = T str φ (x1)(S 1 , . . . , S n ) Op T str φ (x2)(S 1 , . . . , S n ) . For T φ (x) = µZ i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n we put T The following result follows from a similar result for LTLK from [22] . A selfcontained proof can be found in [?]:
Theorem 6. The model checking problem for the µ-calculus of non-mixing epistemic fixpoints is hard for non-elementary time.
Conclusions and comments
We have presented a fragment of the µ-calculus of knowledge having a decidable model-checking problem. We argued in the introduction that the decidability result does not seem to be achievable using tree automata or multi-player games. Two-player games with one player having incomplete information and with non-observable winning conditions from [6] do not seem to be appropriate for the whole calculus as they are only equivalent with a restricted type of combinations of knowledge operators and fixpoints, as shown on page 9. We conjecture that the formula νZ p ∨ AX.P a Z is not equivalent with any (tree automaton presentation of a) two-player game with path winning conditions. Translating this formula to a generalized tree automaton seems to require specifying a winning condition on concatenations of finite paths in the tree with "jumps" between two identically-observable positions in the tree. This conjecture extends the non-expressivity results from [4] relating AT L and µ − AT L.
The second reason for which the above-mentioned generalization would not work comes from results in [9] showing that the satisfiability problem for CTL or LTL is undecidable with the concrete observability relation presented here. It is then expectable that if a class of generalized tree automata is equivalent with the µ-calculus of nonmixing epistemic fixpoints, then that class would have an undecidable emptiness problem and only its"testing problem" would be decidable. Therefore, the classical determinacy argument for two-player games would not be translatable to such a class of automata.
